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Abstract. In an effort of searching for a new source of revenue for funding the infrastructure 
development for Indonesia, the government chose to do tax amnesty in 2016. This research 
was conducted to study the effects of factors (wealth, tariff periods, tax penalties, and audit 
probability) towards tax compliance. Tax compliance measured from the number of units 
reported by taxpayers, the amount of value indicated by taxpayers, and participation from 
taxpayers. The study uses primary data that generated through experimental economics. 
The methods used are Variance Analysis. The result showed that the taxpayer with higher 
income has lower compliance rather than the taxpayer from lower income. The taxpayers 
prefer to report their assets at lower rates. The effort of enforcement from the government by 
implementing tax penalties and audit probability shows greater effect towards tax compliance. 
Keywords: tax amnesty, tax compliance, variance analysis, experimental approach.
Abstrak. Dalam rangka mencari sumber pendapatan baru, untuk pembiayaan 
pembangunan infrastruktur seluruh wilayan Indonesia, pemerintah memutuskan memilih 
melakukan amnesti pajak pada tahun 2016. Penelitian ini dilakukan sebagai sebuah 
kajian untuk mempelajari efek faktor-faktor (kekayaan, periode tarif, denda dan peluang 
audit probability) terhadap kepatuhan wajib pajak. Kepatuhan wajib pajak diukur 
dari unit harta yang diikutsertakan dari yang seharusnya dilaporkan, nilai harta yang 
diikutsertakan dari yang seharusnya dilaporkan, dan keikutsertaan wajib pajak. Penelitian 
ini menggunakan data primer yang dikumpulkan melalui serangkain percobaan ekonomi. 
Metode yang digunakan adalah uji ragam. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa wajib 
pajak dengan kekayaan tinggi memiliki tingkat kepatuhan yang rendah dan wajib pajak 
lebih menyukai untuk mengikuti amnesti pajak pada tingkat tarif terendah yakni pada 
2%. Upaya dari pemerintah dengan menerapkan denda dan peluang audit probability 
menunjukkan efek yang besar terhadap tingkat kepatuhan wajib pajak. 
Kata Kunci: pengampunan pajak, kepatuhan pajak, analisis varians, pendekatan eksperimental.
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Introduction
The plan of infrastructure droved the government to target National income at 1882,5 
trillion rupiahs for the year 2016, with tax revenue targeted at 1360,2 trillion rupiah which 
is 74% of National income. However, until Mei 2016 the amount of tax revenue accepted 
is only 364,1 trillion rupiah, which is just 26.8% of the amount, targeted according to state 
budget (APBN) 2016. From the last two years, the amount of tax revenues has decreased by 
82%, which described in Figure 1. The government has, for the last two years, been intensely 
working on infrastructure development; this can see from the increase of tax target in 2015 
and 2016. This condition drove the government to search for alternative fiscal policy as the 
new sources of fund. 
Figure 1. Realization of Tax Revenue year 2011-2016
Besides that, Indonesia also faced by how low the level of tax compliance is. Table 1 
that shows the reflection of tax compliance. Table 1 shows that in the year 2013 the amount 
of registered taxpayer or taxpayers who have tax ID number (NPWP) is around 24 million. 
According to census data, the number of a productive citizen in 2013 is approximately 90 
million. The level of compliance also can be seen from the percentage of the amount of 
annual notification (SPT) registered from taxpayers. The rates are lies between 50%-60% 
that is considered low. 
Challenged with the need for revenue for infrastructure development and how low tax 
compliance is in Indonesia, the government chose to do tax amnesty program. According to 
The Act number 11 of 2016, tax amnesty is the abolition of taxes that ought to be owed. This 
act is not a subject to sanctions of tax administration and criminal penalties in the filed of 
taxations of assets acquired in 2015 and earlier which have not been reported in the SPT by 
paying off all tax arrears owned and paying some tax ransoms. 
Many of tax amnesty programs have brought succession such as a considerable amount 
of revenues and increased compliance with the previous tax offenders. Aside from raising 
revenue in short time, tax amnesty also acted as a smooth transition towards stricter tax 
system (Joulfian, 1998). Some of the countries have implemented tax amnesty programs such 
as Argentina, India (Le Borgne and Baer, 2008), South Africa and including Indonesia itself. 
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Table 1. The Reflection of Tax Compliance
Year Taxpayer Registered Taxpayer required SPT SPT registered SPT compliance (%)
2011 18,640,757 17,694,317 9,332,626 52.74
2012 22,030,583 17,659,278 9,482,480 53.70
2013 24,347,763 17,731,736 9,416,457 53.11
2014 27,945,570 18,357,833 10,828,808 58.99
2015 30,044,103 18,159,840 10,945,173 60.27
2016 32,769,255 20,165,718 12,269,290 60.84
According to Ragimun (2012), tax amnesty in South Africa applied a “Pull and Push 
Strategy.” “Pull” is by giving incentives to taxpayers to attract them participating in the 
program, which is by invalidating the tax interest and giving tax ransoms at the lowest rates 
possible. “Push” strategy is by applying a pressure to tax offenders in the form of the increase 
in quantity and quality of tax audit probability. This strategy brought tax amnesty in South 
Africa succession. Indonesia has conducted tax amnesty programs twice in 1965 and 1984, 
but both of the programs have been a failure (Santoso and Setiawan, 2009). Ragimun (2012) 
added the cause of the failure of Indonesia’s 1984 tax amnesty was the program not being 
followed by reformations in tax systems as a whole. At that time, revenues from oil and gas 
mainly dominated National income. 
Research involving tax amnesties have been done throughout the years and by many 
studies. This specific area of research is particularly interesting because while tax amnesty 
always been seen as the most practical way to generate tax revenue in short amount of time 
(Malik and Schwabb, 1991; Parle and Hirlinger, 1986). It is also viewed as an imposition 
towards tax compliance. An honest taxpayer sees this program as an unfair treatment towards 
them because tax offenders could get by just by paying a few tax penalties (Recherberger 
et al., 2010; Alm et al., 1991). So, this program can suffer the loss of compliance from 
honest taxpayers. As happen in India (Purnomolastu, 2017), reoccurring tax amnesty raised 
expectations towards other future tax amnesties, so it decreased future tax compliance. This 
program also is seen as components of reform in tax administrative system (Mikesell, 1986). 
Methods used in studies about amnesties mostly including survey, collecting data 
and using experimental. Recherberger et al. (2010) have done research focused on social 
psychological factors, such as perceptions of justice and punishment objectives. Alm et al. 
(1990) also researched tax amnesty using experiment method. The research purpose is to 
learn on predicted behavioral from taxpayers that based on several factors that are thought to 
affect the individual’s decision to pay taxes. The study wants to test a hypothesis of compliance 
following tax amnesty. According to the result, future compliance will decrease following 
tax amnesty, because it affected honest taxpayers that see the programs as a reward for tax 
offenders, but if the program is accompanied and possibly followed by enforcement from the 
government; in the form of tax penalties; the level of tax compliance increases. 
Indonesia still holds a lot of tax potential, mainly from higher wealth taxpayers. The 
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number of tax revenues collected from Income tax (PPh) 21 and PPh 29 only about four 
trillion until eight trillion rupiahs. While in actual the potential from PPh 21 and PPh 29 
is reaching 200 trillion rupiahs. This statement also supported by the amount of deposit 
account guaranteed by deposit insurance agency (LPS) for high wealth taxpayers which 
amount to above two billion rupiahs. Indonesia uses tax progressive system where the rate of 
tax collection with the percentage that increases with the higher the amount used as the basis 
of taxation, and the percentage increase for any given amount each time it rises.  According to 
PPh 21’s tariff, a taxpayer with an income of 1 billion and 2 billion will be subject to the same 
tax rate. Which both will be a tax for income above 500 million in progressive terms, this is 
considered unfair to taxpayers with a wealth of 1 billion, because the taxpayers considered 
himself charged more tax rates but still have to pay the same tax rate with 2 billion taxpayers. 
This is one of the reasons as for why taxpayers with higher income tend to avoid paying 
their taxes. The tendency of the avoidance from higher taxpayers sees as a problem towards 
Indonesia’s tax compliance. Aside from the loss of tax basis potential, it also causes the loss of 
tax revenue. Tax amnesty program is one of the ways to bring back the previous tax deviant 
along with increasing the compliance of higher income taxpayers. 
The tax amnesty program in Indonesia lasted for nine months divided into three periods. 
The first three months, the tariff used is the lowest which is 2%. Based on data released by 
the Directorate General of Taxation (DJP), it is during this period that many taxpayers report 
their wealth. The reason being that the 2% rate is the lowest, so the taxpayer seeks to exploit 
the profit by paying the tariff as small as possible. At the end of the period of the tax amnesty 
program, the taxpayer who passes the audit probability and proves not to report all his assets 
will be giving a penalty. The applied penalty is 200%. According to Alm and Beck (1993), the 
tax amnesty program has the potential to reduce the level of compliance of long-term taxpayers, 
because honest taxpayers consider this forgiveness program as a shortcut for tax evaders and it is 
considered unfair to the honest taxpayers. Thus, Alm et al. (1990) added that the tax amnesty 
program should accompany by government efforts in the form of a tax penalty to improve 
long-term compliance. The tax penalty will encourage the taxpayer psychologically to report his 
assets on the tax amnesty program. Christian et al. (2002) also studied the factors of subsequent 
filling based on empirical data in Michigan. 
Indonesia also faced with a low level of tax ratio. This low rate of tax ratio is due to low 
taxpayer compliance rate. The government is trying to make tax reforms to increase the tax 
ratio. The changes were carried out with improvements to the system of audit probability and 
development of its human resources. One of the regulations that have done is the disclosure 
of Financial Informations; according to Research (Juanda et al., 2010) which examines the 
tax compliance rate in the self-assessment system by using the experimental method stated 
that the probability of audit probability has a positive relationship with the tax compliance 
level. A high level of audit probability will increase tax compliance if accompanied by high tax 
penalties will increase taxpayer compliance that increases the amount of tax amnesty program 
participation. Ross (2012) argues that, in addition to the audit probability, publication efforts 
from the government are an appropriate step to increase taxpayer participation in tax amnesty 
programs.
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Although there are many types of research about tax amnesty in some countries, 
there are not yet researches using Indonesia as the focus of the study. Indonesia undergoes 
the tax amnesty programs in the year of 2016 with the purpose to collect revenues and as 
well as letting the tax evaders to pay their taxes. As stated above, Indonesia faced with the 
low compliance, primarily from higher wealth taxpayers. These tax evaders have potential 
to raise national revenue, so the government thought of a way to bring back these tax 
evaders in tax forgiving programs that are called tax amnesty. However many problems 
arise surrounding the programs itself, as mentioned above the programs if not followed by 
government force will lower the tax compliance, in other words, will cause the program to 
fail. This research does with the purpose of studying the factors that thought to be relevant 
with the decision of taxpayers to comply with the recent tax amnesty program. These 
factors will analyze whether it will affect the taxpayer’s decision to meet in tax amnesty 
program or not. 
The experimental method is used explicitly because it involves the behavioral study 
of taxpayers that is compliance. The reason is that studying compliance is not possible to 
be done through field study. Compliance is not a something directly can be asked to each 
taxpayer whether the taxpayer is honest or not, so to study compliance it needs a tool where 
the behavioral of taxpayers can observe, that is through experiment. They purely decide the 
decision made by each taxpayer in the experiment, and this decision will lead to the tax 
compliance in the program. 
These four factors along with the interaction between the four elements will be analyzed 
to see the effect on taxpayer compliance as the response. In this study, the compliance sees 
from the size of the unit of assets declared from which it should report, the value of the assets 
maintained from which it should indicate, and the taxpayer’s participation. Therefore this 
study aims to: First, analyze the influence of wealth factor, tariff period, tax penalty and audit 
probability opportunities towards assets units declared during the tax amnesty program. 
Second, examine the impact of wealth factor, tariff period, tax penalties and audit probability 
opportunities towards the value of the assets proclaimed at tax amnesty program. Third, 
analyze the influence of wealth factor, tariff period, penalty and audit chance for probability 
towards taxpayers participation in tax amnesty program.
Method
The type of data used in this study is the primary data. The primary data obtained 
are derived from economic experiments because the necessary data for this study is not yet 
available in Indonesia, so it needs to generate through economic experiments. There are four 
factors with each factor having two levels as seen in Table 2. So, there will be 16 treatment 
combinations. A total of 16 treatment combinations will test to 96 students of IPB as a unit 
of the experiment.
The experimental design used in this study was Factorial Randomized Block Design 
(RAKF) with four factors by incorporating repeat components. The RAKF model used can 
be seen in Equation (1). 
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 (1)
where  
with,  is: First, The percentage of assets units declared from the supposedly reported 
level of wealth the i-th, in the j-th rate period, on the k-th tax penalty, and at the l-th audit 
probability; Second, the percentage of asset value incurred from what should be reported of 
the level of the wealth the i-th, at the j-th rate, on the k-th tax penalty, and at the l-th audit 
probability; Third,the percentage of the taxpayer’s participation of the level of wealth i-th at 
the j-th rate, on the k-th tax penalty, and at the l-th audit probability μ: Average acceptance 
in general (regardless of 4 factors); αi is the effect of the level of wealth of the i-taxpayer, (i = 
1 for low wealth, i = 2 for high wealth); βj is the influence of the tariff period of the j-th tax 
amnesty, (j = 1 for the tariff of 2 periods, j = 2 for the tariff of 3 periods); δk  is  the effect of 
the k-th tax penalty (k = 1 for a 200% penalty, k = 2 for a 400% penalty); γl is the effect of 
l-th audit probability opportunity, (l = 1 for probability 25% , l = 2 for probability 75%.
Tabel 2. Factors and Levels
Index Factors Level
i Wealth
1= Low
2= High
j Tariff Periods
1= 2 Tariff Periods (2%, 8%)
2= 3 Tariff Periods (2%, 3%, 5%)
k Tax Penalty
1= 200%
2= 400%
l Audit Probability
1= 25%
2= 75%
The model will be analyzed using variance analysis (ANOVA). If the F-test statistic 
shows the tested factors and their interactions have a significant effect on the response, 
and then LSD tests will follow. The simulation of economic experiments based on induced 
value theory with incentive use (Friedman and Sunder, 1994). The experiment is based on 
environment control to allow the experimenter to only analyze the effect of the factors towards 
the response (Juanda, 2009).  The population of this research is all the tax evaders who should 
have joined tax amnesty with the understanding of the consequences if they decide to join tax 
amnesty programs where they have to pay tax based on the level of tariff and if they choose 
not to participate amnesty programs that will charge with a tax penalty. The sample used is 
college students of Bogor Agricultural University (IPB) with the same understanding with 
the taxpayers who should have joined tax amnesty programs. 
 In this experiment, the student acts as a taxpayer with a given unit of assets and cash. 
Each asset represents the high wealth and low wealth. The taxpayers with low wealth have 
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carried a total of six units with the value range from 10 million rupiahs until 500 million 
rupiahs. The taxpayers with high wealth were given a total of twelve units with the value 
range from 550 million rupiahs until 6 billion rupiahs. The enumerator will then act as a 
government by conducting a tax amnesty program. For this research, there is two type of 
tariff periods; the two tariff periods is where the lowest rate 2% is extended for six months, 
while the three tariff periods is following with the current tax amnesty programs. At the end 
of the period, the taxpayer will audit with given probability for each taxpayer; taxpayers who 
get the opportunity checked and found not reporting all his assets will be given tax penalty. 
So the taxpayers were able to choose whether to fully report their assets in exchange paying 
for tax ransoms or avoid participating in tax amnesty programs with the probability to be 
given tax penalty for the number of assets hidden. At the end of the experiment, the student 
will be given incentive converted into rupiah according to how many of the wealth is left.
Result and Discussion
The flow of discussion in this study that will be divided based on the response of this 
study, namely declared assets units, the value of reported assets and taxpayer participation. 
Each discussion in the section will analyze the primary factor along with the interaction 
between elements on each response. For the first response, variance analysis will be used 
since it fulfilled normal distribution and homogeneity assumptions, after that the study will 
be followed by a simple bar chart graphics to see the means between the level of each factor. 
While for the last two assumptions, will only use mean difference analysis followed by bar 
chart because both of the premises not met. The value of significance used is 10%, 
The first respon is assets units declared. In this response, the only amount of assets 
units are focused on determining whether the factors are going to influence the decision of 
units stated. The analysis used was variance analysis using the model above.  For low wealth 
taxpayers given six assets units, while for high wealth taxpayers, given 12 assets units. Based 
on the result of variance analysis in Table 3, it is found that the wealth factor and tax penalty 
were significant. This means that the difference of a taxpayer’s wealth affect the taxpayer’s 
willingness to report the unit of his assets. As seen in Figure 2, taxpayers with lower wealth 
tend to include their assets to be reported in tax amnesty program. This data is convenient 
with the finding in the current condition in Indonesia where high wealth or higher income 
taxpayers tend to avoid paying their taxes.
The cause, first of all, is depicted above where the higher wealth taxpayers are feeling 
unfair towards progressive tax system, where they should pay the same rates without 
considering the amount of their wealth. Second, in this program both of taxpayers with 
high and low wealth are imposed on the same amount of tax penalty which is 200% (or 
400%), this will put a great deal on lower wealth should they be found being dishonest 
towards their reports. The amount of penalty charged to taxpayers with lower wealth is 
unusually high, they may have some wealth valuable enough to keep from reporting them, 
but the idea of being charged 200% (or 400%) will undo their intention, so they likely 
choose to comply.
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Table 3. Percentage of Wealth Factors, Tariff Periods, Tax Penalty 
and Audit Opportunities for Assets Units Declared
Source Sum of Squares df
Mean 
Squares F Sig
Corrected Model 15887.242a 33 481.43 2.01 0.01
Intercept 657194.4395 1 657194.44 2737.21 0.00
Wealth 1278.746024 1 1278.75 5.33 0.02*
Tariff_Periods 27.21230686 1 27.21 0.11 0.74
Tax_Penalty 1051.900975 1 1051.90 4.38 0.04*
Audit 444.9059005 1 444.91 1.85 0.18
Repetition 102.9271456 2 51.46 0.21 0.81
Wealth * Tariff_Periods 588.9387605 1 588.94 2.45 0.12
Wealth * Penalty 113.6323763 1 113.63 0.47 0.49
Wealth * Audt 167.1304654 1 167.13 0.70 0.41
Tariff Periods * Tax_Penalty 259.31185 1 259.31 1.08 0.30
Tariff Periods * Audit 167.1305532 1 167.13 0.70 0.41
Penalty * Audit 1333.382165 1 1333.38 5.55 0.02*
Wealth * Tariff_Periods * Tax_Penalty 0.051454992 1 0.05 0.00 0.99
Wealth * Tariff_Periods * Audit 37.50039581 1 37.50 0.16 0.69
Wealth *Tax_Penalty *Audit 407.4601526 1 407.46 1.70 0.20
Tariff_Periods * Tax_Penalty * Audit 45.27277045 1 45.27 0.19 0.67
Wealth * Tariff_Periods *Tax_Penalty * Audit 425.9758917 1 425.98 1.77 0.19
Other Factors 524.7413176 16 524.74 2.19 0.14
Error 8956.294045 62 559.77
Total 14885.99266 96
Corrected Total 687967.6739 95
a. R Squared = .516 (Adjusted R Squared = .269), *)sig. 10%
Source: Data Processed
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Figure 2. The Difference between High Wealth and Low Wealth 
in assets unit declared
On the other side, taxpayers with higher wealth have 7% less unit declared in the 
program compared to low wealth income. In this experiment, the top wealth gave assets 
with very high value. So, the tendency for high wealth to avoid participating in tax amnesty 
program is quite high. They have the incentives to keep the wealth from being reported. 
Because if they can avoid being an audit, the wealth will belong to them entirely without 
being charged by paying tax ransoms in tax amnesty programs. This thought is what the most 
of high wealth taxpayers will choose, so the likelihood of compliance of them indeed is low.
Figure 3. The Difference between Tax Penalty 200% and Tax Penalty 400% 
in assets unit declared
The factor of tax penalty also is statistically significant according to Table 3. The high tax 
penalties on the tax amnesty program affect the taxpayer’s willingness to report the unit of his 
assets. As seen in Figure 3, when taxpayers faced with a higher tax penalty, their compliance 
will raise for about 10% more units reported. Indonesia applied 200% tax penalty at the end 
of tax amnesty programs, according to this experiment, the higher the rate of tax penalties 
encourages the taxpayer to be more compliant. So, if Indonesia were to set up the tax penalty 
higher, it would result in higher compliance. Although practically speaking, the current value 
of tax penalty is already high enough to push some taxpayers to report their taxes. This fact is 
by the research of Juanda et al. (2010) that the higher the rate of tax penalties the higher the 
level of tax compliance is. 
Commonly, taxpayers will choose the lowest rate possible for paying their tax rates in 
the tax amnesty programs. In the current tax amnesty, the lowest rates are in the first three 
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months, and according to data collected from DJP, the most assets declared are in the first 
period. For this experiment, the period of the lowest rates which is 2% extended for six 
months, so for the total the tax amnesty only have two periods tariff.
Figure 4. The Interaction between Wealth and Tariff Periods in assets unit declared
 
As seen in Figure 4, there is only difference in the response in 2 tariff periods between 
low wealth and high wealth. But, from the Figure 4 the amount of assets unit declared from 
low wealth still is higher than those announced from high wealth, no matter how the periods 
are regulated, the lowest rate tariff would always be the favorite. The more detailed picture of 
each assets unit reported in 2 tariff periods can be seen in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Detailed assets unit declared during 2 Tariff Periods
Tax audit also has a significant share in determining tax compliance. The result of 
tax audit was not statistically significant according to Table 3. However, if the factor were 
to interact together with a tax penalty, the effect will be substantial.  As seen in Figure 6, 
when taxpayers are faced with loose audit probability, and lower tax penalty the amount of 
units declared is smaller when compared to the units stated in the condition of stricter audit 
probability and higher tax penalty.  If seen from lower tax penalty, the unit reported rose by 
11% in when the taxpayer faced with more stringent audit probability. Taxpayers will be 
charged with 200% tax penalty into their assets if found dishonest during the tax amnesty 
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programs, moreover, with more rigorous audit probability the chance of being an audited 
rose. This condition is enough to push the taxpayers to report their assets unit when faced 
with more stringent probability. 
Figure 6. The Interaction between Tax Penalty and Audit Probability  
in assets unit declared
 
Taxpayers would think twice before decide to avoid paying their taxes in higher 
audit, so in this condition the level of compliance is high. However in the condition of 
tax penalty is 400% there are no differences in the response of unit reported. The reason 
is although there is a rise of unit reported in audit chance of 75%, the level of tax penalty 
of 400% is already high enough so the taxpayers would not find any difference between 
a lower audit and higher audit. They are focused on how high the penalty if they were to 
avoid paying taxes.  The difference of response depends on tax penalty. If a condition of 
high penalty and high audit were met, there is no reason for taxpayers to avoid their taxes. 
So, they will comply, this result is convenient with the result found by Alm et al. (1990) 
that a good tax amnesty should be followed by government enforcement in the form of the 
audit to increase tax compliance. 
Assets values and taxpayer participation are discussed together in this section. The 
analysis was done with the mean test because classical assumptions were not met. In Table 4, 
there are two respons with each response shows percentage, variance, and sign of each factor 
and interaction. The analysis in this section was done with the hypotheses whether the two of 
the level makes a difference in the respon or not, or in other words whether the difference in 
the two-level will cause the taxpayers to comply or not. 
The assets value in here means the actual amount of assets of each taxpayer owns, 
between low wealth and high wealth there is a real difference of assets value. As explained 
in the procedure of experiment, that for small wealth taxpayers the range of assets value is 1 
million rupiah to 500 million rupiahs. While for high wealth taxpayers, the scope for assets 
value is 550 million rupiah until 6 million rupiahs. Participations of taxpayers measured from 
whether the taxpayer participating (as in reporting) their assets or not in the tax amnesty 
program. 
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Tabel 4. Percentage of Wealth Factors, Tariff Periods, Tax Penalty  
and Audit Opportunities for Assets Value Declared 
Condition
Respons
Assets Value Declared Participation
(%) Variance Sig. (%) Variance Sig.
Low Wealth 87.90
Heterogen 0.221
99.31
Homogen 1
High Wealth 84.05 99.31
2 Tariff Periods (2%, 8%) 85.12
Heterogen 0.495
98.61
Heterogen 0.04*
3 Tariff Periods (2%, 3%, 5%) 86.82 100
Tax Penalty 200% 81.35
Heterogen 0.002*
99.31
Homogen 1
Tax Penalty 400% 90.59 99.31
Audit 25% 81.90
Heterogen 0.013*
99.31
Homogen 1
Audit 75% 90.04 99.31
Low Wealth and 2 Tariff Periods 89.78
Homogen 0.166
98.61
Homogen 1
High Wealth and 2 Tariff Periods 80.45 98.61
Low Wealth and 3 Tariff Periods 86.01
Homogen 0.749
100
Homogen 1
High Wealth and 3 Tariff Periods 87.63 100
Low Wealth and 2 Tariff Periods 89.78
Heterogen 0.064*
98.61
Homogen 0.088
Low Wealth and 3 Tariff Periods 86.01 100
High Wealth and 2 Tariff Periods 80.45
Heterogen 0.012*
98.61
Heterogen 0.088
High Wealth and 3 Tariff Periods 87.63 100
Tax Penalty 200% dan Audit 25% 73.28
Heterogen 0.001*
100
Heterogen 0.165
Tax Penalty 400% dan Audit 25% 90.52 98.61
Tax Penalty 200% dan Audit 75% 89.43
Heterogen 0.443
98.61
Heterogen 1
Tax Penalty 400% dan Audit 75% 90.67 100
Tax Penalty 200% dan Audit 25% 73.28
Heterogen 0.014*
100
Heterogen 0.217
Tax Penalty 200% dan Audit 75% 89.43 98.61
Tax Penalty 400% dan Audit 25% 90.52
Homogen 0.671
98.61
Heterogen 0.5
Tax Penalty 400% dan Audit 75% 90.67 100
*)Sig: 10%
As shown in Table 4, for the response of assets value declared, the higher tax penalty 
will increase assets value stated. There are 3% more of assets value announced when taxpayers 
are faced with a higher penalty as seen in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. The Difference between Tax Penalty 200% and Tax Penalty 400%  
in assets value declared
It is shown that the tax amnesty program with higher tax penalty rate will increase the 
compliance, same as seen in the previous response of assets unit declared. High tax penalties 
forced the taxpayer to report his assets when the rate of tax penalties is increased to 400% the 
amount of assets value indicated by the taxpayer increases by 2%. The rate of the tax penalty 
undoubtedly will affect the taxpayer decision in this program; they are forced to think how 
much they will be charged if they were dishonest. If they are found dishonest at the end of 
the program, they will be charged with 200% of their value assets. Juanda et al. (2010) has 
researched with experimental setting the tax penalty in 200% and audit probability 75% and 
found that the higher the tax penalty rate is, the higher the level of compliance will. The same 
also happens with the factor of-of tax penalty where the higher the chance of being audited 
the higher the value reported will be (See Figure 8). 
Figure 8. The Difference Between Audit Probability of 25% and Audit Probability of 75%  
in Assets Value Declared
The tax amnesty programs in Indonesia followed by a type of audit as stated in Financial 
Openness in PMK Number 70/PMK.03.2017 where each Bank has to report to tax officer 
Puri Mahestyanti. The Determinants of Tax Compliance in Tax Amnesty Programs
http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/etikonomi
DOI: htttp://dx.doi.org/10.15408/etk.v17i1.6966
106
about the information of taxpayers with more than 1 million assets on the account. This rule 
is a way for the government to ensure that no tax evaders will be freed from paying their taxes. 
The amount of 1 million is primarily to target the higher wealth taxpayers because of they 
likely higher to not comply as proven in the experiment. The government enforcement by 
doing an audit of tax amnesty programs will raise the compliance. The higher chance of the 
tax evaders being audited will result in them to comply thus increase the tax compliance in 
general. As stated by Alm (1999) that the tax amnesty programs will follow by an effort from 
the government will raise the tax compliance. 
Figure 9. Interaction between tax penalty and audit probability in assets value declared
As shown in Table 4, there is interaction between tax penalty and audit probability. 
Figure 9 shows at a 200% tax penalty there is a difference in response when the taxpayer 
faced with higher audit probability, when the audit probability opportunity increased into 
the stricter chance of being audited, the number of reported assets value increases by 14%. 
While at a tax penalty of 400%, both did not experience differences in response. This 
indicates that increasing audit probability opportunities will improve taxpayer compliance, 
while in a tax penalty of 400% because the tax penalty rate is high, there is no difference in 
response when taxpayers are faced higher audit probability. At each audit probability level, 
the higher the tax penalty, the higher the amount of reported assets value. This fact is by 
some studies that the tax amnesty program accompanied by government efforts in the form 
of tax penalties and inspection opportunities will improve taxpayer compliance (Juanda et 
al. 2010; Alm et al. 1990).
From Table 4, there are interactions between wealth and tariff periods on both 
responses. In assets, value declared’s response, taxpayers showing more value reported 
in 2 tariff periods. Same as the response in assets value stated, the lowest rate of tariff 
2% is preferable among taxpayers to declare their assets. Interestingly, in both tariff 
periods, taxpayers with low wealth also have higher assets value reported and participation 
compared to taxpayers with high wealth. The taxpayers who want to join the tax amnesty 
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programs will consider paying them in the first period because having the lowest tariff 
to pay with their previously evading tax seen as a benefit towards them. The number of 
value assets each of taxpayers has it the decision to comply. Taxpayers need to consider 
which periods they need to join in paying the smallest amount possible. Therefore the first 
period with the lowest tariff which is 2% has the most significant amount of assets value 
declared. 
Figure 10. Detailed participation between 2 Tariff Periods and 3 Tariff Periods  
on Property Value Declared
As for the response of taxpayer’s participation, more taxpayer is participating in 3 tariff 
periods, with the detailed stacked involvement in each tariff is explained in Figure 12. The 
lowest rate that is 2% holds the highest participation among the other rates. In the tax 
amnesty program in Indonesia, the periods are divided into three periods for each period for 
three months long. The first period has the lowest tariff, which is 2%, so if the tax evaders 
decided to join tax amnesty in the first period, they only need to pay 2% from their wealth. 
This fact is the best tariff for tax evaders who reason because once they pay their share of 2% 
from their wealth, they will free from their previous tax evasions, so the participation in the 
first three months is high. The dishonest taxpayers who seek forgiveness will join the first 
period where the rate is the lowest. This taxpayer indeed inline with the fact that most of the 
tax collected in the tax amnesty programs are mostly from the first period, taxpayers use this 
first three months with the lowest rates to pay the taxes. In this experiment, the lowest tariff 
that is 2% lengthened into six months period. If the 2% was the reason the government able 
to collect a huge amount of taxes then with the period being longer surely the amount of tax 
collected will raise. 
As seen in Figure 11, the two tariff periods makes no difference to increase the amount 
of tax collected or in this matter the number of people participating. In the two tariff periods, 
the tariff increased drastically to 8% that only have 3% people participating in this period. 
The huge gap between the first period of the second period affect the taxpayers to join tax 
amnesty in the first period. However, looking at the two tariff periods, the lowest tariff of 2% 
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still be the favorite where most of the taxpayers participating. Afterall the taxpayer’s still wants 
to join mostly in the period where the tariff is the lowest.
Figure 11. Detailed participation between 2 Tariff Periods and 3 Tariff Periods  
on Taxpayer’s Participation
Conclusion
The level of wealth affects the level of taxpayer compliance, evident from the three 
responses that the high wealth tends to disobey. Tax penalty affect the level of compliance in 
this program, the higher the tax penalty, the higher the compliance will be. In three of the 
response the tax penalty interacted with audit probability will raise the compliance, if the 
government set the tax penalty high then followed the program will high audit probability 
the compliance will rise. The tariff period indicates that the taxpayer prefers to participate 
in the period with the lowest rate to report assets. They seek the lowest tariff to pay with the 
lowest amount of their wealth. The third response which is taxpayers participation, the level 
of involvement is almost 100%. The reason lies within the subject used for the experiment, 
which is the college student. The issue tends to risk-averse that is why even faced with the 
lower probability of being audited they still tend to comply. 
Indonesia should focus on taxpayers with high wealth, with the current condition of 
many of taxpayers with high wealth avoid their taxes; it is the government duty to create 
higher enforcement to bring back the tax offenders. Tax amnesty programs were proved 
to bring back some of the tax offenders into paying their taxes, but in this also being an 
issue towards honest taxpayers who see the program as a reward for tax evaders. So to keep 
the taxpayers in check and not to lose the honest taxpayers, the government must do tax 
reforms. The stricter tax system is a must to follow tax amnesty program, to increase the tax 
compliance, by implying a more stringent audit specifically for high wealth taxpayers.  There 
is a need for follow-up after the tax amnesty program ends to ensure high tax compliance.
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